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What we do
• Study effect of tax credit reforms on education and employment 
decisions over the lifecycle
• Using a lifecycle model of female labour supply, human capital and 
savings
– Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) and (1999), Keane and Wolpin (1997), Adda
et al (2008), Todd and Wolpin (2006), Eckstein and Lifshitz (2011)
• With parameters estimated using British panel data (BHPS)
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Standard approaches
• Features of traditional welfare evaluations (e.g. Brewer et al, 2006):
1. Estimate impact of reform packages
2. Use static framework
3. Focus on short-run labour supply response
• Counter-examples: Ham and Lalonde (1996), Todd and Wolpin
(2006), Haan and Prowse (2010), etc
• This paper: first attempt to study UK tax and benefit system in 
dynamic context
– Focus is on female response to UK tax credit reforms
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– Dynamic effects via education, experience, productivity and family 
composition
– Also investigate impact on education
Background to reforms: budget constraints
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Background to reforms: budget constraints
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Literature: employment impact of WFTC/EITC
• WFTC
– + 2-7ppt increase in employment rate for lone parents
– Smaller, possibly negative impact for second earners in couples
– Blundell et al (2005), Brewer et al (2006), Francesconi and van der
Klaauw (2004), Francesconi et al (2009)
• EITC
– Positive and substantial impact on employment rate for lone parents 
(e.g. Eissa and Liebman (1996), Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001))
– Modest negative impact for second earners (e.g. Eissa and Hoynes
(1998))
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Literature: impact of WFTC/EITC on other outcomes
• Couple formation and dissolution
– WFTC: mixed evidence (Francesconi and van der Klaauw (2004), Gregg 
et al (2007), Francesconi et al. (2009))
– EITC: small and ambiguous (Eissa and Hoynes (1999), Ellwood (2000))
• Childbearing
– WFTC: Fall in fertility for lone parents, rise for couples (Francesconi and 
van der Klaauw, (2004), Brewer et al (2008))
– EITC: little effect (Baughman and Dickert-Conlin (2009))
• Anticipation and labour market attachment effects?
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Model: overview of female lifecycle
Life in three stages:
1. Education (up to 18/21)
− Secondary, A-levels or university (determines type of human capital)
2. Working life (18/21-59)
− Labour supply {0hrs, 20hrs, 40hrs} and consumption
− Partnering and childbearing
3. Retirement (60-69)
− Consumption only
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Model: dynamics of female earnings
• Log wage equation
siasiassia uvv += −1ρsiaiasssia veWw +++= )1ln(ln αs=schooling
i=individual
a=age
• Experience accumulation
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Model: dynamics of family income
• (Exogenous) family formation dynamics
– Children
• Model youngest child
• Characterised by age
• Arrival probability depends on family characteristics
• Departure with certainty when child reaches age 18
– Partners
• Characterised by education, employment status and wage
• Arrival and departure probabilities depend on family characteristics
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Model: dynamics of family income
• Male wage equation and selection into employment
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• Detailed model of UK tax and benefit system (FORTAX)
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– Taxes: income tax, NI, council tax
– Benefits: child benefit, maternity grant, tax credits, income support, housing 
benefit, council tax benefit, free school meals
Model: decision-making environment
• Risk averse individuals faced with uncertainty
– Own productivity (health)
– Family dynamics: partnering/separation, child bearing
– Partner employment and income
• No insurance market
– Only implicit insurance through human capital, savings and public policy
• Credit constraints during working life
– So public policy may facilitate transfers across lifecycle
• Decisions taken to maximise expected lifetime utility
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Model: data and estimation
• Model estimated using BHPS data:
– Unbalanced panel of 5,300 females  over 16 waves, 1991–2006
• Multi-step estimation procedure
1. Fix interest rate, discount rate, intertemporal preference parameter
2. Estimate some parameters outside structural model
• Male selection model
• Family dynamics and childcare costs (reduced form)
3. Estimate remaining parameters by method of simulated moments (MSM)
• Parameters include: cost of education, female wage equation, experience accumulation, 
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taste for employment, distribution of unobserved heterogeneity
• Results below based on data simulated by the model
Model fit: female log hourly wage
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Model fit: female employment rate
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Model fit: female employment rate by age of child
1
Female employment rate (by education)
.
4
.
6
.
8
-3 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21
lpoly smoothing grid
s=1, data s=1, sim
s=2, data s=2, sim
s=3, data s=3, sim
Lifecycle employment effects of reforms
Total Single 
childless
Single 
mother
Couple 
childless
Couple 
mother
Tax 
adjust
Non-revenue neutral effect (ppt/100):
1999+WFTC 0.015 0.000 0.103 -0.001 -0.042 –
2002
2004
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Lifecycle employment effects of reforms
Total Single 
childless
Single 
mother
Couple 
childless
Couple 
mother
Tax 
adjust
Non-revenue neutral effect (ppt/100):
1999+WFTC 0.015 0.000 0.103 -0.001 -0.042 –
2002 0.005 0.007 0.050 0.000 -0.038 –
2004
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Lifecycle employment effects of reforms
Total Single 
childless
Single 
mother
Couple 
childless
Couple 
mother
Tax 
adjust
Non-revenue neutral effect (ppt/100):
1999+WFTC 0.015 0.000 0.103 -0.001 -0.042 –
2002 0.005 0.007 0.050 0.000 -0.038 –
2004 0.006 0.025 0.032 -0.003 -0.031 –
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Lifecycle employment effects of reforms
Total Single 
childless
Single 
mother
Couple 
childless
Couple 
mother
Tax 
adjust
Non-revenue neutral effect (ppt/100):
1999+WFTC 0.015 0.000 0.103 -0.001 -0.042 –
2002 0.005 0.007 0.050 0.000 -0.038 –
2004 0.006 0.025 0.032 -0.003 -0.031 –
Revenue neutral effect (ppt/100):
1999+WFTC 0.014 -0.002 0.103 0.000 -0.043 +0.014
2002 0.002 0.002 0.046 0.001 -0.039 +0.039
2004 0.005 0.021 0.029 -0.003 -0.027 +0.029
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Note: “Tax adjust” = change in basic rate of income  tax
Education effect of reforms
Basic Intermediate Higher
1999 baseline 0.318 0.472 0.209
Revenue neutral effect (ppt/100):
1999+WFTC 0.014 -0.003 -0.011
2002 0.023 -0.005 -0.017
2004 0.034 -0.009 -0.025
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Employment effects of reforms, allowing for 
education response
Total Single 
childless
Single 
mother
Couple 
childless
Couple 
mother
Tax 
adjust
Revenue neutral effect, no education response (ppt/100):
1999+WFTC 0.014 -0.002 0.103 0.000 -0.043 +0.014
2002 0.002 0.002 0.046 0.001 -0.039 +0.039
2004 0.005 0.021 0.029 -0.003 -0.027 +0.029
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Note: “Tax adjustment” = change in basic rate of income  tax
Lifecycle employment effects of reforms allowing 
for education response
Total Single 
childless
Single 
mother
Couple 
childless
Couple 
mother
Tax 
adjust
Revenue neutral effect, no education response (ppt/100):
1999+WFTC 0.014 -0.002 0.103 0.000 -0.043 +0.014
2002 0.002 0.002 0.046 0.001 -0.039 +0.039
2004 0.005 0.021 0.029 -0.003 -0.027 +0.029
Revenue neutral effect, with education response (ppt/100):
1999+WFTC 0.005 -0.006 0.080 -0.002 -0.051 +0.021
2002 -0.010 -0.006 0.014 -0.001 -0.048 +0.050
2004 -0.012 0.012 -0.017 -0.006 -0.037 +0.045
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Note: “Tax adjustment” = change in basic rate of income  tax
Conclusion
• Develop a female lifecycle model to study UK tax and benefit system 
in dynamic context
– Dynamics via education choices, experience accumulation, productivity 
and family composition
• Estimated on UK data
• Used to understand effect of UK tax credit reforms
• Results suggest:
– Lifecycle employment effects (holding education fixed):
• Large for lone mothers and mothers in couples
• Marginally positive overall
– But education choices sensitive to reforms
– Lifecycle employment effects (allowing education response):
• Effects fall substantially 
• Overall effect now negative
